Moral Realism and God
W. Zachary Wolff, 2000

Can God be the basis of moral truth? I would like to analyze two distinct views on the nature of this question. The first is comprised of divine command theories, the second, variations on the ideal observer theory. The fundamental distinction between these two is made by Plato in his writing Morality and Religion. Euthyphro proposes a divine command theory, but when asked to define morality, finds himself looking at something more similar to the ideal observer theory. The train of logic in this dialogue seems to discount the divine command theory.

To provide a starting ground for my arguments, I would like to first state that I am a strong moral realist. I will explain and defend this position such that its conclusion may be used as premises in further argumentation. Paraphrasing from Charles Taliaferro, I will define a moral realist as one who believes there exist certain moral truths independent of the approval of any society or individual. I would like to qualify this by saying that prima facie truths may be rare, but that all things considered, and with an appropriate amount of qualifications and situational evidence, moral truths exist, even if they cannot be fully understood or expressed by our limited intelligences and language.

Taliaferro offers several lines of argument for and against this proposition. First, we must consider the diversity of morality expressed in various human cultures. Taliaferro offers two strategies for rejecting this objection, both of which I feel are valid. First, we consider the fact that humans seem to be fallible. Society's moral codes have emerged over time due to an enormous variety of causes, and it is quite possible that in those cases where society's or individuals differ in their moral view points at least one party, and possibly more, is simply incorrect. The analogy to Frege's argument concerning logic seems valid. Next, we examine the purported diversity of belief in more detail and find that some constants do seem to hold and that many moral differences emerge from disagreements regarding non-moral facts.

The second objection to moral realism holds that there is no set methodology for investigating the moral truths in question. I believe a methodology does exist, namely, ideal observer theory. In order to begin to look at objective moral truths objectively, one must strive toward a few criteria. Firstly, an omniscience of non-moral facts. Secondly, omnipercepience, Roderick Firth's label for the state of having complete affective appraisal of all interested parties. Thirdly, impartiality, an elimination of a personal preference for either point of view, but distinct from disinterest or indifference. All three of these qualities are impossible for humans. Ideal observer theory states that for proper moral reasoning one ought to try to decide what an ideal observer would think in that situation.

Moral realism can also be attacked on the grounds that the entities it proposes, moral truths seem to defy metaphysical explanation. While moral truths are certainly difficult to understand metaphysically, I do not feel that they are any odder than other somewhat abstract concepts of philosophy. Free will certainly does not seem to be a thing in the normal sense of the word, but many would argue that it exists. Similarly, knowledge, consciousness, and emotion escape complete metaphysical description though they all seem to exist.

Finally Taliaferro deals with the argument that moral realism has led to a great deal of evil. This argument seems almost laughable to me. I would refer to my above argument regarding the variety of moral beliefs which states that some people hold moral beliefs which are quite simply wrong. Although miscalculations and other types of errors in the field of engineering have led to horrible disasters such as the explosion of the Challenger Space Shuttle, it seems ludicrous to argue that engineering has no objective backing via mathematics and the physcial sciences. The second flaw in this argument is even more devastating in that it springs from an internal contradiction. To argue that what something did in the name of good was indeed evil seems to be referencing some higher truth. What the person or people did was evil, regardless of their opinions regarding the action.

While this is in no way a complete or conclusive set of arguments, I hope the above discussion has been sufficient to establish the view of moral realism as plausible. It is from this stance that I will discuss the question of morality based on God. The morality of which I speak will be an objective morality.

I will refer to divine command theories as any theories which take as their central premise the fact that any thing that has some moral quality has that moral quality because God or Gods have a certain quality of opinion regarding that thing. I believe these theories, in general, to be flawed on the surface, though they can be made complete with certain modifications, some of which seem to change their nature to a degree such that they no longer fit the definition of divine command theories. I will discuss my objections and the necessary responses and alterations that follow.

First, I argue that divine command theories run into a basic contradiction, or circularity of definition when they are combined with omnibenevolence. This argument may largely be regarded as invalid by those who do not ascribe the attribute of omnibenevolence to God, but it should be rather persuasive to those who wish to hold on to this belief. To say that God is all good is to say that God has some certain moral quality. Following my definition, divine command theories would state that this thing (God) has that moral quality because God has some quality of opinion regarding that thing (God). It seems rather odd to assert that God is good because God thinks that God is good. To say that God is good implies that some standard of goodness exists, which God meets completely.

One version of the divine command theory, espoused by Thomas Hobbes and Peter Geach is that God names what is moral and has this authority based on God's power. One argument against this is that it reduces their view to power worship, but I will not follow this line of thought as I do not see anything inherently damning about power worship. Instead, I argue that this is not an argument regarding ethics, but one regarding rationality. Geach states, 'A defiance of an Almighty God is insane.' Notice the word choice. Insane is most nearly the opposite of rational, not moral. Obeying the commands of an almighty God should always lead to the best possible outcome for oneself. This is quite different than the question of morality, in which the moral act may not always be in the actor's best interest. Under the conception Geach and Hobbes promote it seems that the moral act, that is the act that the almighty God commands, would always be in one's best interest in the long term if not immediately.

One possible alteration to the general divine command theory is to postulate that things do not hold their moral quality because God has some quality of opinion regarding the things in question, but that instead things have a moral quality in comparison to an absolute standard of morality which God created. Some argue that this stance includes the view that God could have made morality differently. I do not think that this is a problem with the theory. I believe that absolute moral truths exist, as do absolute physical laws, but I believe that God could have created the world such that either would have been different than they actually are. Instead I argue that this modification does not avoid the problem of circularity I brought up. For God to have created an absolute standard of good, God would have to have been extant before good was extant. Under this assumption it seems illogical to call God all good.

A clever way to avoid both of my two previous arguments, namely that defining morality in terms of God's opinion is circular and that justifying God's opinion in terms of God's power is only an appeal to rationality, is one taken by Aquinas, Augustine, and others. This view holds that God is not just good, god is essentially good, that in fact, God is the good, or goodness itself. I find this argument rather convincing in a way, but I do not think the theory it puts forth falls under my stated definition of a divine command theory. It does not state that a thing which has a moral quality has that quality because God has some quality of opinion towards it. The good, or goodness itself seems incapable of having an opinion regarding the nature of other things. Instead this theory seems to propose that a thing is good to the degree that it measures up to an objective standard of goodness, here named God. This fits rather well with my stance of moral realism. I feel it is important to note that this theory is not dependent on God. It defines God as 'the good' but it would be equally logical to state that some set of moral truths 'the good' exists and that morality is simply the comparison of some given thing with this absolute standard of goodness. To call that standard God, the Tao, or any of the other names we often give it is not necessary, nor is it necessary to identify it as the creator of the universe or any of the other roles we often assign to God.

The second way in which morality could have some basis in God relates to ideal observer theories. I outline ideal observer theory above, but will here define it as a theory which has as its central premise the fact that a thing has a certain moral quality of a thing because an omniscient, omnipercipient, impartial observer would hold a certain quality of moral opinion towards it. This theory avoids many of the problems of divine command theories. If God is named the ideal observer it is very nearly a divine command theory. I feel the important difference lies in the specification of these qualities of God. Notice that omnibenevolence is absent from the list. God cannot be all good and define good. Defining God as the good escapes this objection, as mentioned above, but does not play a role in our discussion of ideal observer theories. God as the ideal observer seems to be a God that is somehow subservient to a higher moral law. By having the three stated qualities of an ideal observer, a being would have no choice but to name certain things moral and others immoral. It would follow as necessary. While one can name the ideal observer God, it seems to conflict with other concepts of God one might prefer. I feel it is best to keep the ideal observer as an abstraction to be reached for as a methodology for studying morality, not as an actual basis for the nature of morality.

In conclusion, I feel that the most plausible way for God to be the basis of moral truth is neither for God to command moral truth, nor for God to be the ideal observer of moral truth. Instead I think it is best to define God as moral truth. I find satisfaction in the fact that this view taken by prominent Christian philosophers such as Aquinas and Augustine seems to coincide (either completely or in part) with the views taken by Plato and Lao Tzu. The acceptance from widely different schools of philosophy lends some credibility in my opinion. My personal conception of God is as the good, as well as much more. This conception would encompass the above argument and add to it that God is physical law as well as spiritual. Perhaps the extension of this theory to the physical realm will provide a subject for a second paper.