Hume's Limited Moral Relativity
W. Zachary Wolff, 2001

Hume describes moral evaluations as sentiments of pleasure or pain. In forming a moral evaluation of a motive or character trait we first observe what actions follow from the motive or trait in question. Next, we observe what sentiments certain actions tend to cause in those directly effected by the actions. Finally, we make the sentiments of these others our own through sympathy. These particular sentiments of pleasure or pain, when felt with regard to a motive or character trait, are moral evaluations. This account seems to accept some sort of relativity in moral judgments. However, Hume offers a picture of the world in which human nature and external circumstances lead directly to moral judgments that are constant across time and culture. By allowing individual sentiment to play a role in moral judgment, yet simultaneously recognizing the universal principles that underlie the formation of these sentiments, Hume walks a fine line between moral absolutism and relativism.

Hume first defines moral evaluations as a type of perception, as they are operations of the mind, and the only action of which the mind is capable is the action of perception. 'The mind can never exert itself in any action which we may not comprehend under the term of perception; and consequently that term is no less applicable to those judgments, by which we distinguish moral good and evil, than to every other operation of the mind,' (456). Hume has earlier divided perceptions into two kinds: impressions and ideas. 'All the perception of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call Impressions and Ideas,' (1). He therefore now sets out to determine of which type our moral evaluations consist. He quickly discards ideas, the subject of reason, as a viable alternative:
'Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood . . . Whatever therefore is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of our reason. Now 'tis evident our passions, volitions, and actions are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreemnt; being original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions. 'Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason. (458, ellipsis mine)
This leaves Hume only one alternative: moral evaluations are a type of impression.

Specifically, impressions arising from virtue are pleasurable, while those arising from vice are the opposite. 'Here we cannot remain long in suspense, but must pronounce the impression arising from virtue, to be agreeable, and that proceeding from vice to be uneasy,' (470). Hume argues that to explain the cause of the particular feelings that constitute moral evaluations is to explain the cause of moral evaluations. 'An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind. In giving a reason, therefore, for the pleasure or uneasiness, we sufficiently explain the vice or virtue,' (471).

With this in place, Hume moves on to the task of explaining the cause of the feelings of pleasure that accompany the viewing of the actions that result from the natural virtues. The quality that all these virtues hold in common is their tendency to render a man more suitable for society. ' . . . most of those qualities, which we naturally approve of have actually that tendency, and render a man a proper member of society: While the qualities, which we naturally disapprove of, have a contrary tendency, and render any intercourse with that person dangerous or disagreeable,' (578).

But why should the good of society cause me, as an individual, any pleasure? The first reason is entirely self-interested: society as a whole is greatly beneficial to me as an individual. My means of obtaining goods are greatly amplified by society, both by allowing great works of many men in collaboration and by allowing me to develop a particular skill while relying on others for needs outside this skill, while those goods I have already obtained are protected by it. 'Tis by this additional force, ability, and security that society becomes advantageous,' (485). The second reason stems from the transmission of feelings through sympathy. The good of society is necessarily the good of some individuals. When I observe the good accrued to these individuals and the corresponding feelings of pleasure they experience, I experience feelings of pleasure in myself through the mechanism of sympathy. 'Tis also evident, that the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they represent,' (319).

Inherent in Hume's view is the idea that things could have been different. We could experience different feelings toward the traits we now consider virtuous. However, this difference could not be accomplished through any small changes in our state of affairs. Critically, so long as society is of benefit to mankind, those traits that ready an individual for participation in society will be esteemed virtuous. Society will be beneficial so long as humans exhibit desires that are beyond their individual abilities to fulfill. ' . . . tho' to consider him only in himself, he is provided neither with arms, nor force, nor other natural abilities, which are in any degree answerable to so many necessities. 'Tis by society alone he is able to supply his defects,' (485). Hume is never entirely explicit about what would have to change in the world or in human nature to change this fact. I think it is safe to say that any world in which this is not true would be radically different from our own, both in its physical makeup an in the ways in which humans would interact and judge each other morally.

Hume addresses cultural relativity directly and discards it. 'This goes so far, that some philosophers have represented all moral distinctions as the effect of artifice and education. . . . This system, however, is not consistent with experience,' (578, ellipsis mine). Hume's first criticism of this position is that there are virtues other than the natural virtues that make men amiable to society. ' . . . there are other virtues and vices beside those which have this tendency to the public advantage and loss,' (578). Secondly, Hume notes that our ideas of virtue and vice must come prior to anyone making reference to them in our education. ' . . . had not men a natural sentiment of approbation and blame, it cou'd never be excited by politicians; nor wou'd the words laudable and praise-worthy, blameable and odious, be any more intelligible, than if they were a language perfectly unknown to us,' (579).

Whether or not Hume's view implies that nothing is really virtuous or vicious depends on the definition of 'really'. If by 'really' one means 'in reality', then Hume certainly acknowledges real virtue and vice. The exposition above describes how things come to be virtuous and vicious. If by 'really' one means 'in all possible worlds' then Hume does not find anything to be really virtuous or vicious, but I hold that this is an advantage of his view. Were the world fundamentally different, morality, which is surely a part of the world, would be different as well.

The most interesting case arises if by 'really' one means 'without reference to an observer'. In this case, Hume does not find anything to be really virtuous or vicious. This position is hard to swallow initially, but a careful look at Hume's explanation makes it more palatable. The observer in question is required to adopt a particular type of viewpoint. 'In order, therefore, to prevent those continual contradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of things, we fix on some steady and general points of view,' (581). So, all human observers should make the same moral evaluations. The only way in which virtue or vice might change with regard to the observer is if the observer is fundamentally different from humans as we know them. Again, this seems acceptable. If the makeup of our minds were fundamentally different, morality, for us, would be as well. It is worthwhile to note that is only humans that we make moral evaluations of. It seems to be no coincidence that our moral evaluations extend only to those creatures that are able to view the world much as we do.

In summary, Hume gives us a description of natural virtues as those qualities that ready a man for participation in society. His accounts of the nature of moral evaluations and the nature of society explain how we come to find these qualities virtuous. These accounts are dependent on circumstances of the outside world and of the human mind. This brings in some aspect of moral relativity, but it is a rather weak one as opposed to cultural relativity. Morality, as it applies to humans, is a function of basic qualities of the human mind and basic facts about humanities place in the natural order of the world. Through this limited relativity, Hume achieves a delicate balance between opposing philosophical positions.

References:
Hume, David. Treatise on Human Nature