Good for and Good to: an analysis of Hobbes' ethics
W. Zachary Wolff, 2001

Hobbes endorses psychological egoism, a view of human nature that states that people's actions are motivated only by their individual desires and aversions. This does not imply that people are essentially selfish, as we may have desires to help others or aversions to harming others. However, Hobbes holds that the desire to preserve and protect one's own life (and correspondingly the aversion to one's own death or injury) is primary in all people. Hobbes holds that in the state of war of all against all everyone's life is in constant danger. Obeying the first and second laws of nature serves to escape the state of war. From these premises, it follows that we are bound by reason to follow these laws. I think Hobbes is right that preserving and protecting one's own life is a very important desire, but I think he is wrong not to allow any other desire to ever take precedence over this one. This difference invalidates the first and second laws of nature.

Hobbes lays out his version of psychological egoism in the context of his larger view of the human mind and body. First he argues that, 'the imagination is the internal beginning of all voluntary motion,' (38). This accords with common sense. The thought of a voluntary action must come before the action. Any action that does not meet this criterion must be involuntary. Hobbes then defines 'endeavor' as, '[the] small beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions,' (38). These motions come directly from the imagination. Finally, Hobbes distinguishes two types of endeavor. The first, desire, is defined as an endeavor that is toward the thing that causes it (38). The second, aversion, is defined as an endeavor that is away from the thing that causes it (38). Additionally, in the state of nature, good and evil can only be defined relative to an individual, and they are defined precisely as those things one has a desire for and those things one has an aversion to, respectively (39).

These definitions are problematic. Hobbes overlooks the distinction between the object of a desire and the cause of that desire. An endeavor toward food is not caused by food, but by hunger. So this endeavor is not a desire, following Hobbes' definition, as it is not toward the thing that caused it. It can be classified as an aversion to hunger, as it is an endeavor away from hunger, which is its cause. This is not entirely satisfactory, as it seems that we want to be able to define an endeavor toward food as a desire for food.

A particular problem arises in the case of desires that take nonexistent things as their object. These desires cannot be caused by the object of desire, as there is no such object. At first this seems like a triviality that only affects those who desire unicorns or the fountain of youth. However, desire for things nonexistent actually plays a key role in Hobbes view of the establishing of the Commonwealth. He holds that the inclination to create the Commonwealth comes from people's natural desire for safety, that is the preservation and protection of one's own life (93). Yet he is very explicit in stating that no person is safe in the state of nature (89). It seems that Hobbes says that safety is desired when it does not exist. I do not see how he can reconcile this with his definition of desire. Hobbes cannot get out of this quandary by appealing to the corresponding aversion. The aversion to one's own death surely cannot be caused by one's own death.

The above problems can be circumvented by changing Hobbes' definitions. We can define a desire as an endeavor that is toward its object, and an aversion as an endeavor that is away from its object. Unfortunately, there is a further problem with these definitions. Hobbes wants to claim that all a person's voluntary actions have as their end the obtaining some good for himself (93). However, if a good thing for a particular person is only a thing that he desires, a desire is only an endeavor toward something, and endeavors are the beginnings of all voluntary actions, it follows trivially that all voluntary actions are toward things that are good for oneself. Hobbes has not made am empirical claim about human nature, but an analytic claim about the definitions he has given to certain words. I cannot think of a definition of desire that frees Hobbes from this trap. I will continue with his definitions and the solace that an analytic truth here may not be such a bad thing. By definition, all voluntary actions are toward things we desire, because to perform an action voluntarily is to desire to perform that action.

Hobbes' claim that all people desire to preserve and protect their own lives does not imply that people are essentially selfish, in any meaningful sense of the term. The above discussion shows that a person's voluntary actions will always be towards things he considers good for himself. It does nothing to suggest what those things are. A person could consider helping others to be good for himself. Hobbes' claim amounts to the claim that every person considers the preservation and protection of his own life good to himself. This seems like a very natural view and not at all selfish.

Hobbes uses this claim to motivate the first and second laws of nature. His argument begins with his claim that no one is safe in a state of war (89). This seems fairly uncontroversial. The first law of nature is to seek peace, that is the opposite of war. This is clearly motivated by a desire for safety and the unsafe condition of war. The second law of nature tells us precisely how to seek peace, 'Be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace, and defense of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself,' (92). This law is more controversial.

It is not immediately clear what Hobbes means by, 'as far-forth . . . he shall think it necessary.' He may be referring to necessity in human affairs in general or to necessity in a particular case. If he means necessity in human affairs in general, the claim is not too strong. In general it seems necessary to give up very few rights for peace and defense of self. The only rights that must be given up are those that are given up in any society: the right to harm others, the right to others' property, and similar rights. However, if Hobbes is referring to necessity in a particular case, more extreme concessions may be demanded. If it is the case that I will be attacked for saying certain things, pursuit of peace and defense of self necessitate that I give up my right to free speech. It seems that Hobbes means the latter.

In some particular instance, almost any right must be given up to protect oneself. In fact, the right to protect oneself seems to be the only right that cannot be given up, as Hobbes states (93). Even on this stronger interpretation of the second law of nature, obedience to it does seem to be mandated by reason if we accept Hobbes' claim that every person's primary desire is to preserve and protect his own life. I do not accept this.

An interesting implication of Hobbes' claim is that one can never desire one's own injury or death. 'As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his life, because he cannot be understood to aim thereby, at any good to himself. The same may be said of wounds, and chains, and imprisonment;' (93). What I think is crucial here is the definition of 'good to himself”, and particularly the interpretation of 'to'. Earlier, Hobbes speaks of a good to an individual as something that is good from that individual's perspective. Here, he seems to take 'good to himself' as meaning, 'benefiting himself'. This change in definition makes the quoted statement invalid. While it is true that no one can be understood to aim at benefiting himself by submitting to death or injury, it is false that no one can be understood to aim at accomplishing something that is good from his perspective by submitting to death or injury.

So, a person may reasonably violate the laws of nature. He may withhold rights, the giving up of which is necessary for peace (thereby not seeking peace), so long as he thinks withholding those rights will accomplish some good from his point of view, even though the state of war can cause no benefit to him. The question now becomes: When can withholding rights, the giving up of which is necessary for peace, accomplish some good from one's point of view? The clearest example I can think of is the right to defend others. Hobbes states that this right must be given up for peace (152). If by defending a loved one I can remove the threat to the loved one of certain death, I see this as a benefit from my point of view. For even in the state of war, death is only imminent, not certain. Hobbes recognizes this in acknowledging the right to self-defense (98). Even if I die, I can see this action as good from my point of view if it eliminates the certain death of a loved one that would have come without the action.

To summarize, Hobbes motivates the first and second laws of nature with the claim that all people desire the preservation and protection of their own life. While this claim is true, it is not true that there are never desires that take precedence over this. Hobbes arrives at this from the claim that no possible good to oneself can come from one's injury or death. Here he misuses his own definition of good, that is, good from one's point of view, rather than of benefit to oneself. Thus, the motivation for the laws is undermined. If I have a desire that takes precedence over my desire for self-preservation, I may rationally act on that desire, even if it means violating the first and second laws of nature.

References:
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan